John Kerry’s overwhelming confirmation as the next USsecretary of state presents a welcome opportunity to consider what the point ofthe job is. Now that Hillary Clinton has left Foggy Bottom for a well-earnedrest, it’s worth stating that public diplomacy – even of the remarkablysuccessful kind that she embodied – was not Thomas Jefferson’s idea of beingthe country’s chief diplomat, nor, one suspects, Clinton’s.
An extraordinarily able and shrewd politician with anunmatched global Rolodex, Clinton accepted early on a circumscribed definitionof the role for reasons that probably only she truly knows. For the UnitedStates, and the world, however, it has left a legacy of diplomatic detachmentfrom a range of conflicts and challenges that require more than occasionalpresidential rhetoric and judicious reserve about the use of military force.
Looking back, it is clear that the role of secretary ofstate in the Obama administration was constructed around primarily domesticpriorities: first, managing successfully the poisonous political rivalrybetween the two giants of the Democratic Party; second, reassuring the Americanpublic that the “era of wars” was indeed coming to an end; and third, that whenAmerica would project its power and influence to neutralize national securitythreats, it would be far more in the form of drones and special forces thandiplomats.
The great promise of a president uniquely prepared byheritage, intellect and experience to guide America’s 21st century globalmission with a global perspective gave way to a largely reluctant, conventional– and highly militarised – form of engagement with the world. Underlying thesepolitical motivations was the deeply held belief that in the aftermath of theGreat Recession the country’s global position was defined entirely by itseconomic strength. “Foreign policy begins at home” became a mantra as familiarin the era of economic crisis as “Yes, we can” was during the 2008 campaign.
What this legacy bequeaths to Kerry are two false choicesthat he must confront without alienating that same White House from which hewill ultimately derive his influence. First, it is time to recognise thatforeign policy begins just as often, and just as importantly, abroad. To besure, from the earliest days of the Republic through World War II it has beenunderstood that America’s global influence is built on its ability to backwords with resources, and diplomacy with arms, investments and tradeagreements.
Even so, Chinese nationalism, terrorism in the Sahel, asavage civil war in Syria, climate change, cyber-warfare, the Iranian nuclearprogram and the EU crisis are challenges with distinct roots and reasons farbeyond the shores of America. They need to be encountered and understood outthere – through patient, strategic and often uncomfortable negotiations thatrecognise the value of listening as much as talking.
Otherwise, the risk of surprise on the scale of the one thatstruck on that cloudless day in New York a decade ago will remain – and indeedincrease – in a fragmenting, rapidly changing world. Second, Kerry must mount anew challenge to Washington’s ossified debate about intervention as an instrumentof foreign policy. Syria will soon present him with the best (or worst, as thecase may turn out) reason to do so. For the president’s critics, the US should have taken a much more active,military, role far sooner – including arming the opposition, imposing ano-flight zone and conducting targeted strikes against the regime. Of course,the fact that there isn’t a simple military solution to the Syria crisis isprecisely what makes a dramatic and sustained diplomatic initiative so urgent –and its absence so troubling (and the same argument can be made in relation tothe Iranian nuclear challenge). One need have no illusions about the Russian orChinese views of the crisis to appreciate that without a genuine negotiationwhere they will have to get in order to give, the slaughter will continue – andrisks of regional escalation spike.
But such has been the near-complete militarisation of USforeign policy over the past decade that for all intents and purposes the onlyalternative presented to an invasion of the country is a combination of dronestrikes and targeted killings. The tried and tested principle of diplomacybacked by the threat of force has seen a near-total inversion. Axiomatic now asthe only alternative to doing nothing is the use of lethal force backed by theoccasional choice of diplomacy as clean-up job.
This is unworthy of a great power – and a great foreignservice. During his confirmation hearings, Kerry stated that “American foreignpolicy is not defined by drones and deployments alone.” If that remark is to beremembered as more than one man’s expression of hope over experience, he willhave to make it so.
To engage, to cajole, to give and take, to offer incentivesto allies and enemies alike in pursuit of interests global and national,political and economic, to wield diplomatic power and influence as only Americacan: That is Kerry’s opportunity now – and his challenge.
Nader Mousavizadeh is chief executive of Oxford Analyticaand the co-author, with Kofi Annan, of ``Interventions: A Life in War andPeace.''
