“The conventional army loses if it does not win. Theguerrilla wins if he does not lose.” Henry Kissinger’s observation, made duringthe Vietnam War, should be haunting Hezbollah, the Middle East’s most capableguerrilla force, as it becomes embroiled in an increasingly costly effort tosave the Assad regime. In a meticulously planned operation in October, unitslinked to the Free Syrian Army in the city of Qusayr near the Lebanon borderkilled Ali Hussein Nassif, who was quickly exposed as commander of allHezbollah forces in Syria. His death shed light on the extent of the group’sinvolvement in the conflict.
Hezbollah’s interest in preserving Bashar al-Assad’s seat ofpower is well known, and its leader Hassan Nasrallah has spared no effort inreminding the world of his group’s political support for the embattleddictator. For three decades, the Assad dynasty’s support propelled Lebanon’slargely peasant Shiite population into the halls of government, backed by anarmed wing whose firepower rivals that of many conventional national armies.
Hezbollah’s military commitment in Syria is no less obvious.Reports indicate that Hezbollah recently expanded its actions in Syria toinclude its most valued resource – its highly trained and strategicallyirreplaceable special forces units. Hezbollah’s secretive military wing isreportedly composed of 2,000 to 4,000 professional soldiers and thousands ofreservists hailing from Shiite villages south of the Litani river and the BekaaValley, meant to be called into action to repel a future Israeli invasion.During the 2006 conflict with Israel, the loss of roughly one quarter ofHezbollah’s special forces was assumed to constitute the group’s most severesetback. Secret contingency plans reportedly agreed upon at the highest levelsof the Syrian government and Hezbollah indicate that Hezbollah had reportedlyagreed to commit thousands of its most elite soldiers to defend the Assadregime, either from a “foreign invasion” or in the event that “urgentassistance” was needed.
With Syrian rebels consolidating their gains in outlyingareas of Aleppo and Damascus, there are indications that Nasrallah has alreadybegun to make good on his pledge. Earlier this month, a Saudi newspaperreported that four Hezbollah units, each consisting of 1,300 fighters, had beendispatched to assist the Syrian military in major cities, while the group’selite 901 commando unit has reportedly been fighting in the Homs area sinceJuly. Most recently, Hezbollah’s reported deployments near Syrian chemicalweapons facilities has spurred the Israeli government to threaten militaryintervention as a response to any potential attempt to transfer those weaponsinto Hezbollah bunkers in Lebanon.
Whether these moves were meant to protect these keyfacilities from sensitive sites or transfer their deadly materials, thedeployment nonetheless testifies to the reality that these foreign Shiitemilitiamen have become one of Assad’s most trusted fighting units.
Militarily and politically, Hezbollah has much at stake inthe Syrian conflict, but it is risking even more by attempting to save a pariahregime that may not be savable. The group has incurred hundreds of lossesagainst Syrian rebels, including its valued special forces. Hezbollah cannotoutmatch rebel manpower, and will need to commit its best fighters and mostsophisticated equipment to cut rebel supply lines in the hopes of hindering aDamascus invasion force from gaining traction.
Hezbollah’s arsenal of nearly 70,000 rockets will likelyremain pointed at the Israelis, but the squandering of its crucial elite unitsin Syria could deprive Lebanon’s Shiite community of protection from emboldenedsectarian rivals in the wake of Assad’s ousting. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’sassisting of the Assad regime in committing atrocities will put its leaders inthe crosshairs of future international criminal tribunals, in addition to thosealready investigating the group’s involvement in the assassination of theformer Lebanon prime minister Rafik Hariri. Such negative attention may justspur the European Union to cave to U.S. pressure to place Hezbollah on its listof terror organizations, risking further isolation of the group’s politicalwing.
Most threatening however, is Hezbollah’s increasinglyblatant violation of Lebanon’s commitment to remain neutral in the Syrianconflict, a pledge made in the hopes of preserving the country’s delicatesectarian balance. Nasrallah’s support for Assad has placed Shiites and otherminorities in the future line of fire of Syrian jihadists, many of whom arelikely to turn their guns to Lebanon in retribution in the event of Assad’sousting.
Nasrallah has repeatedly affirmed his belief that the Assadregime will survive. Regardless of whether he is right, his assertionsillustrate the fact that this conflict is one that Hezbollah desperately needsto win.
Daniel Nisman and Daniel Brode are intelligence managers forMax Security Solutions, a geopolitical risk consulting firm based in Tel Aviv
